

Running head: IDEOLOGY AND STEREOTYPE THREAT

Costs and Benefits of Political Ideology: The Case of Economic

Self-Stereotyping and Stereotype Threat

Rick M. Cheung and Curtis D. Hardin

Brooklyn College and Graduate Center, City University of New York

Word Count: 4,915

Key words: self, self-stereotyping, identity, stereotype threat, ideology, system justification

Address correspondence to Rick M. Cheung or Curtis D. Hardin, Department of Psychology, Brooklyn College, 2900 Bedford Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11210, e-mail: mcheung@brooklyn.cuny.edu or cdhardin@brooklyn.cuny.edu.

Abstract

Across two experiments, the cognitive salience of a stigmatized ingroup identity harmed self-evaluation and elicited stereotype-consistent behavior to the degree that participants endorsed the political status quo. In Experiment 1, ethnic identity salience caused Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong to evaluate their own labor as meriting less pay if they were high in social dominance orientation but more pay if they were low in social dominance orientation. In Experiment 2, gender identity salience caused women in the U.S. to evaluate their work on a logic task (but not a verbal task) as meriting less pay if they were politically conservative but more pay if they were politically liberal—a pattern mirrored in task performance. Depending on the degree to which the political status quo is accepted or rejected, findings suggest that members of stigmatized groups can be either implicit participants in their own subjugation or agents of change.

(149 words)

Costs and Benefits of Political Ideology: The Case of Economic Self-Stereotyping and Stereotype Threat

In an early articulation of the social-psychological predicament of members of subjugated groups, W. E. B. Du Bois observed that for an African American it is difficult to avoid “looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (1903/2007; p. 15). In the research reported here, we find evidence that one barrier to freeing oneself from the contemptuous measure of society is the acceptance of ideologies that justify the social and political status quo.

Research shows that making social identity cognitively salient can cause people to think and behave in ways that are consistent with ingroup stereotypes, resulting in self-derogation and underperformance if the ingroup is negatively stereotyped (for reviews, see Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002; Wheeler & Petty, 2001). For example, in instantly classic experiments ethnic identity salience caused African Americans but not European Americans to exhibit greater (a) ingroup stereotype accessibility, (b) doubt in their own ability, (c) self-handicapping, (d) disidentification with their ingroup, and (e) underperformance on standardized tests (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Subsequent research included demonstrations that (a) women but not men perform worse on quantitative exams but not verbal exams when gender is salient (e.g., Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000), (b) the elderly but not young perform worse on memory tasks when age is salient (e.g., Levy, 1996), (c) students from low but not high socioeconomic backgrounds perform worse on intellectual tasks when economic status is salient (e.g., Croizet & Claire, 1998), and (d) Asian-American women express lower self-evaluation of verbal ability when ethnicity is salient but lower self-evaluation of math ability when gender is salient (Sinclair, Hardin, & Lowery, 2006).

Why might people think and behave in ways that perpetuate the very stereotypes that cost them so dearly? Research to date has focused on variety of potential mechanisms at both the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels of analysis (for reviews see Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002; Wheeler & Petty, 2001). As regards intrapersonal levels of analysis, for example, stereotype-consistent attitudes and behavior may reflect the relative accessibility of mental constructs (e.g., Levy, 1996) and increased anxiety about confirming the negative stereotypes (e.g., Osborne, 2001). As regards interpersonal levels of analysis, for example, stereotype-consistent attitudes are stronger to the degree that one believes that close others see the stereotypes as applicable to the self (e.g., Sinclair et al., 2006) and to the degree that one identifies with the stereotyped ingroup (e.g., Schmader, 2002).

In this research we focus on the complementary role of ideology in self-stereotyping and stereotype threat. Ideologies that justify the status quo, including system-justifying beliefs (Jost & Banaji, 1994), hierarchy-enhancing myths (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), dominant ideologies (Kleugel & Smith, 1986), and political conservatism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), rationalize existing social arrangements and stereotypes by explaining their inevitability and desirability. For example, in emphasizing the utility, value, and legitimacy of tradition, political conservatism promotes the status quo by definition. We refer to these and related ideologies that function to explain and justify the status quo as “pro-system.” On the other hand, ideologies that reject the status quo, including hierarchy-attenuating myths (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), counterideologies (Kleugel & Smith, 1986), and political liberalism (Jost et al., 2003; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009), challenge existing social arrangements and stereotypes by explaining their impermanence and undesirability. For example, in emphasizing social change, progress, and egalitarianism, political liberalism challenges the status quo and inequality by

definition (for reviews, see Hardin, Cheung, Magee, Noel, & Yoshimura, in press; Jost et al., 2003, 2009; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). We refer to these and related ideologies that function to subvert and invalidate the status quo as “anti-system.”

Ideology and Self-Stereotyping

We propose that ideological stances in part determine whether one is locked into thinking about the self along stereotypical lines or liberated to think about the self along counterstereotypical lines. Research shows that ideologies affect the ways people think about society. For example, pro-system ideologies like conservatism and social dominance orientation have been shown to predict a variety of social and political attitudes that justify the status quo, including attitudes toward social groups, classes, events, policies, social and political systems, as well as current events (e.g., Jost et al., 2003; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Besides constraining understanding and interpretation of social groups, ideologies may also constrain understanding and interpretation of the self (e.g., McCoy & Major, 2007). Indeed, although people are not always aware of the influences on the self, such influences may nevertheless modulate self-regulatory beliefs or “selfways” (e.g., Markus, Mullaly, & Kitayama, 1997) by defining standards and goals, concerns and threats, and the ways in which one can and should relate to the world (see also Higgins, 1987). We argue that political ideology may influence self-understanding and behavior in just this way.

If ideology constrains selfways, then members of stigmatized groups may think about themselves along stereotypical lines to the degree that they endorse pro-system ideologies. In an experiment that corroborates this hypothesis, gender identity salience harmed women’s math performance, but only if they believed that men are generally better than women at math (Schmader, Johns, & Barquissau 2004, Study 2). In showing that underperformance is linked to

endorsement of stereotypes in a stereotype-relevant domain, this finding suggests that people who hold pro-system beliefs may be vulnerable to thinking and acting in ways that confirm salient ingroup stereotypes, even if it reflects negatively on the self. In short, although the relationship between stereotype content and self-evaluation is known to be complex (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989; Gray-Little & Hafdahl, 2000; Major, Barr, Zubek, & Babey, 1999), people may self-stereotype to the degree that they hold pro-system beliefs.

In contrast, endorsing anti-system ideologies may liberate people to think about themselves in ways that are independent of ingroup stereotypes or even motivate thoughts and behaviors that disconfirm ingroup stereotypes. Although stereotype-disconfirmation effects are rare (for a review, see Wheeler & Petty, 2001), almost none have examined the potential role of ideology. Yet in the one study that did include ideology-related attitudes, results were broadly consistent with our hypothesis. In it, ethnic identity salience caused seventh- and eighth-grade African Americans to perform better in a math task to the degree that they exhibited awareness of racism and believed that achievement as an African American was important (Oyserman, Gant, & Ager, 1995, Study 2). Because confirming a stigmatized identity is incongruent with shared values of resisting racist stereotypes, people who endorse stereotype-inconsistent attitudes may be able to defend against self-stereotyping (cf. Sinclair et al., 2006). Hence, although turning common effects of stigmatized social identities on their heads is likely to be difficult, people who endorse anti-system ideologies may be more prepared to do so.

In sum, our analysis suggests that ideological stance may moderate the degree to which people are vulnerable to self-stereotyping and stereotype threat. People may be subject to self-stereotyping and stereotype threat effects when their stigmatized identity is cognitively salient, but we predicted this to occur only to the degree that people endorse pro-system ideologies. In

contrast, people who endorse anti-system ideologies may be able to maintain their self-worth or even challenge the salient stereotype through self-enhancement and improved performance. In two experiments we assessed the role of ideology in stereotype-related economic self-evaluation (Experiments 1 and 2) and performance (Experiment 2).

Experiment 1

In Hong Kong more than 200,000 Southeast Asian women, almost exclusively Filipina, are employed as domestic workers (Hong Kong SAR Government Information Centre, 2006), earning a statutory minimum of \$5,350 for a year of work although many are known to be paid less (Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, 2001). Domestic workers are required to live in employer residences, and are permitted to return to their home countries just once every two years by law. Unlike most other foreigners in Hong Kong, domestic workers are legally ineligible for permanent residence and are denied a variety of civil rights, including the right to vote.

To examine the role of ideology in the acceptance of this arrangement among the very people disadvantaged by it, domestic workers were asked to report how much they thought they should be paid for their current job when the salience of their ethnic identity was manipulated. We hypothesized that ethnic identity salience would cause Filipina domestic workers to value their labor less if they endorsed pro-system ideologies but value their labor more if they endorsed anti-system ideologies.

Method

Participants. Sixty-seven Filipina domestic workers (median age: 36, range 21–71) participated in Central Hong Kong where they commonly gather during Sunday work breaks. Participants reported an average of six years of work experience (median: 6.25, range: .10–26),

and an average of \$5,230.77 for a year of work (range: \$5,030.77–\$8,461.54), which is approximately one third of the median salary in Hong Kong (Hong Kong SAR Government Census and Statistics Department, 2007). The questionnaire was administered in English, which is one of the official languages of Hong Kong and the Philippines.

Procedure and materials. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in which they evaluated the value of their labor either before (low identity salience) or after completing a short ethnic identification questionnaire (high identity salience). Ethnic identity salience was manipulated using a shortened 10-item Collective Self-Esteem scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) adapted to ethnicity, including items like “The racial/ethnic group I belong to is an important reflection of who I am.” Economic self-worth was assessed by the question “How much money do you think your work is worth for a month of service?” This response was reported together with current salary and judgment of public support for raising domestic workers pay. Endorsement of the status quo was assessed on an eight-item social dominance orientation scale (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994), which included items like “Inferior groups should stay in their place.” SDO has been validated on samples around the world as a reflection of the degree to which one is motivated to justify the status quo (Jost et al., 2003; Pratto et al., 2000). Importantly, SDO ($M = 3.30$, $SD = .91$, $\alpha = .70$) was not affected by the ethnic identity salience manipulation ($t < 1$).

Results and Discussion

To assess whether ethnic identity salience affected self-evaluation differently as a function of endorsement of the status quo, a series of hierarchical regression analyses was conducted. Manipulated ethnic identity salience (High = 1 vs. Low = 0) and self-reported SDO (z-transformed) were entered in the first step and the Ethnic identity X SDO interaction term was entered in the second step.

Consistent with the hypothesis that ideology constrains self-perception, ethnic identity salience caused domestic workers in Hong Kong to devalue their own labor but only to the degree that they were high in SDO, as indicated by a significant Ethnic Identity Salience X SDO interaction, $\beta = -.33$, $p = .02$. Figure 1 shows effects of identity salience on economic self-worth (annual salary in US dollar) as a function of SDO (- 1 *SD*, + 1 *SD*). Although ethnic identity salience reduced economic self-worth among Filipina domestic workers who scored high on SDO, $\beta = -.43$, $p = .02$, ethnic identity salience, if anything, increased economic self-worth among Filipina domestic workers who scored low on SDO, $\beta = .23$, $p = .23$. Neither of the main effects was significant ($ps > .15$), and the observed pattern was equally strong when current pay was included as a covariate.

In sum, Filipina domestic workers devalued their work as a function of ethnic identity salience, but did so only to the extent that they endorsed attitudes that are known to justify the economic status quo. Those who endorsed pro-system ideology indicated that their work merited 25% less pay when they were reminded of their ethnicity (\$6,451.19) than when they were not reminded of their ethnicity (\$8,602.69), confirming stereotypes in Hong Kong that devalue Filipina ethnicity. In contrast, those who rejected pro-system ideology not only maintained their economic self-worth, but indicated that their work merited nearly 20% more pay when they were reminded of their ethnicity (\$8,049.68) than when they were not reminded of their ethnicity (\$6,872.95). In other words, depending on endorsement of SDO Filipina domestic workers either evaluated the monetary value of their own labor in a stereotype-consistent way at no small cost to the self, or in a stereotype-inconsistent way to the benefit of themselves. The fact that the salience of a stigmatized ingroup identity can have opposite effects on self-worth suggests that ideology may enable some individuals to escape the predicament of self-stigmatization (see also

Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Oyserman et al., 1995), and moreover that self-stereotyping and stereotype threat effects cannot be fully understood without considering the position of the self within the ideologically constructed world.

Experiment 2

Experiment 1 demonstrates that a salient stigmatized identity can cause people to devalue themselves on a dimension as concrete as pay for one's own job—at least among those who endorse pro-system ideologies. Experiment 2 was designed to replicate and extend findings of Experiment 1 by investigating both self-assessment and behavior among American women as a function of common gender-related stereotypes. Three changes were implemented to more directly implicate the role of stereotypes and to provide a link to research on stereotype threat. First, in addition to economic self-evaluation, Experiment 2 also assessed behavioral performance on a Stroop color-naming task (Stroop, 1935). Second, to provide more direct evidence that effects are specifically linked to stereotypes, the Stroop task was framed as either a test of logic or verbal skill—skills that are strongly related to common gender stereotypes in the U.S. If the effects are due to ways in which the status quo and concomitant stereotypes are ideologically perceived, then the effects should be replicated only in the domain in which women are stereotyped as inferior (i.e., logic). In the verbal domain, however, ideology may not moderate the effect of gender salience because both (a) positive stereotypes about women's verbal abilities are common across pro-system and anti-system ideologies, and (b) research suggests that effects of ideology are animated under conditions in which people feel inferior (e.g., Yoshimura & Hardin, 2009). Finally, to provide evidence that the ideology-related effects of Experiment 1 are not limited to social dominance orientation, ideology was assessed along the dimension of political liberalism-conservatism, which is not only highly correlated with SDO but

also known to strongly predict a variety of attitudes related to endorsement of the status quo (for reviews, see Jost et al., 2003, 2009).

In sum, gender identity salience should elicit economic self-derogation and underperformance among women performing a “logic” task but not a “verbal” task, and should do so to the degree that they identify themselves as politically conservative. In contrast, women who identify as politically liberal should exhibit self-enhancement and performance improvements in the logic task.

Method

Participants. One-hundred thirteen undergraduate female participants at Brooklyn College participated for partial course credit. Participant ethnicity (48% White, 23% Black, 12% Asian, 9% Hispanic, and 8% with other or unspecified ethnic background) did not qualify the reported results and is not discussed further.

Procedure and materials. To examine effects of gender identity on self-evaluation and performance as a function of ideology, participants completed the Stroop task and self-evaluation either before or after completing a Collective Self-Esteem measure adapted to gender, including items like “My gender is an important reflection of who I am.”

To assess the role of stereotypes in ideology-related self-evaluation, the Stroop task was framed as either a “logic task” or a “verbal task.” Participants were told that the “Stroop Logic (Verbal) Task” concerned “understanding various personal factors associated with logic (verbal) skills” to help them understand their “strengths and weaknesses in logic (verbal) skills.” Otherwise the task was identical. Participants were instructed to indicate as quickly and accurately as possible the correct color of each word in a series of words. Across 60 trials presented randomly for each participant, each target word was printed in either the color red,

blue, green, purple, or brown: One third of the target words were color terms printed in a different color (e.g. the word "red" in blue type), one third of the targets were color terms printed in the same color (e.g, the word "blue" in blue type), and one third of the targets were the string "xxxx" in blue type. Task performance was measured by the number of correct trials completed. Five outliers whose performance was above 2 standard deviations above the sample mean were excluded.

After completing the Stroop task, participants evaluated their economic self-worth by indicating how much money they thought they deserved if they were paid for the task (up to \$4.75) rather than receiving course credit. Participants also indicated how well they thought they performed the task on a scale of 1 to 7.

Political ideology was assessed on two items: "What best describes where you stand on politics in general?" (1 = "Very Liberal", 7 = "Very Conservative"), and "What do you believe best describes your affiliation with political parties?" (1 = "Strong Democrat", 7 = "Strong Republican"). Responses to these items ($M = 3.34$, $SD = 1.18$, $\alpha = .47$) were not affected by the experimental manipulations ($ts < 1$). Lastly, participants completed demographic items and items concerning how important logic and verbal skills were to them, and finally were fully debriefed.

Results and Discussion

To test if gender identity salience affected women as a function of their acceptance of the status quo, a series of hierarchical regression analyses was performed on economic self-worth and task performance. Manipulated gender identity salience (High = 1 vs. Low = 0), task (Logic = 1 vs. Verbal = 0) and self-report political orientation (z-transformed) were entered in the first step, all two-way interaction terms were entered in the second step, and the three-way interaction term was entered in the third step.

Economic self-worth. Replicating Experiment 1, gender identity salience decreased women's economic self-worth to the degree that they were politically conservative, as indicated by a significant Gender Identity Salience X Political Orientation interaction, $\beta = -.42, p = .02$. Although the Gender Identity Salience X Political Orientation X Task interaction was not significant, $\beta = -.07, p > .75^1$, consistent with the hypothesis that the effect is due to system-congruent stereotypes that stigmatize women, the opposite effects of gender identity salience were only observed when the task was framed in terms of logic, $\beta = -.48, p = .05$, but not when the task was framed in terms of verbal skill, $\beta = -.34, p = .19$. Figure 2 shows the effects of identity salience as a function of political conservatism ($-1 SD, +1 SD$). Conservative women indicated that their work on the logic task merited less pay when their gender identity was more salient ($M = \$3.21$) than less salient ($M = \4.24), $\beta = -.47, p = .03$. On the other hand, liberal women's economic self-worth was not affected by gender identity salience. Indeed, if anything, they indicated that their work on the logic task merited nonsignificantly more pay when their gender identity was more salient ($M = \$3.85$) than less salient ($M = \3.63), $\beta = .10, p = .65$.

When the Stroop task was framed in terms of verbal skill, a dimension on which women are stereotyped as superior, no effects of ideology were observed ($ps > .19$). Instead, women indicated that their work on the "verbal" task merited more pay when their gender identity was more salient ($M = \$3.75$) than less salient ($M = \2.93), $\beta = .33, p = .03$, congruent with previous research on self-stereotyping as a function of identity salience (e.g., Sinclair et al., 2006).

Stroop task performance. Depending on participant political orientation and the task they thought they were working on, gender identity salience harmed or helped performance as indicated by a significant Gender Identity Salience X Political Orientation X Task interaction, $\beta = -.56, p = .05^2$. More importantly, and consistent with the hypothesis that identity salience effect

is due to system-congruent stereotypes that stigmatize women, the Gender Identity Salience X Political Orientation interaction was significant when the task was framed in terms of logic, $\beta = -.61, p = .01$, but not when the task was framed in terms of verbal skill, $\beta = .14, p = .64$. Figure 3 shows the effects of gender identity salience as a function of political conservatism (+ 1 *SD*, - 1 *SD*). Although conservative women performed nonsignificantly worse when gender identity was more salient ($M = 40.61$) than less salient ($M = 46.84$), $\beta = -.28, p = .17$, liberal women performed significantly better when gender identity was more salient ($M = 50.71$) than less salient ($M = 41.16$), $\beta = .43, p = .04$. Thus, in a pattern mirroring the effect on economic self-worth, liberal women working on the “logic” task completed more Stroop trials when their gender identity was more than less cognitively salient, whereas conservative women did the opposite.

On the other hand, in the verbal-task conditions the only significant effect was the main effect of political ideology. Liberal women performed better ($M = 46.42$) than conservative women ($M = 41.11$), $\beta = -.33, p = .05$.

In sum, results of Experiment 2 replicate and extend results of Experiment 1. The extent to which women evaluated themselves and performed in accordance with gender stereotypes was moderated by political ideology. Consistent with the common American stereotype that portrays women as illogical but verbal—itsself a reflection of a society in which women are underrepresented in careers involving math and science—self-identified conservative women economically self-derogated more and tended to perform worse on a logical task (but not an identical verbal task) when their gender identity was salient. In contrast, the stereotype was not rendered impotent among liberal women. Instead its potency was turned on its head in a kind of social-cognitive jujitsu: They self-enhanced and performed better when their gender identity was salient.

General Discussion

This research provides the first direct evidence that the harmful effects of stereotype salience occur among people who hold pro-system beliefs but are productively subverted among people who hold anti-system beliefs. Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong (Experiment 1) and American women working on a logic task but not a verbal task (Experiment 2) devalued their work as a function of ingroup identity salience, but only to the degree that they endorsed pro-system beliefs. In contrast, women who were anti-system ideologically rejected the salient stereotypes of inferiority, and responded in ways that were contrary to the salient stereotype. Thus, in assessing the effects of two different social identity manipulations on two different samples involving two different outcome variables across two experiments, and by demonstrating opposite effects for people who are ideologically pro-system and anti-system, we found convergent evidence that effects of ingroup identity salience on members of negatively stereotyped groups depend on whether one is ideologically pro- or anti-system.

To date, over 100 articles have been published examining the effects of stereotype salience and threat, with the signature effect that stereotyped targets attitudinally and behaviorally assimilate towards the salient ingroup stereotype even when it results in self-doubt, self-handicapping, and inferior performance. In seeking to understand the underlying mechanism, researchers to date have focused on intrapersonal factors (e.g., Levy, 1996; Marx & Stapel, 2006) and interpersonal factors (e.g., Schmader, 2002; Sinclair et al., 2006; for recent reviews, see Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007; Steele et al., 2002). Our findings complement this literature by identifying a new and independent ideological conduit through which salient stereotypes may affect stereotyped targets. Results suggest that the degree to which an individual is hampered by negative ingroup stereotypes depends on whether

one accepts or rejects legitimizing ideology, as assessed by either social dominance orientation or political conservatism.

One potential limitation of these results is that variables associated with intrapersonal and interpersonal models were not measured, allowing the possibility that the contrasting effects of ingroup identity on conservatives and liberals may also be moderated by these variables. For example, perhaps liberals and conservatives differed in how anxious they were in the face of the identity salience manipulation, which in turn could result in differences in performance and self-evaluation. However, across two experiments and on both economic self-evaluation and task performance, liberal participants did not exhibit smaller effects of ingroup identity salience. Whether the subjugated social identity involved participant ethnicity (Experiment 1) or gender (Experiment 2), liberal participants expressed greater self-worth (Experiments 1 and 2) and better task performance (Experiment 2).

The present findings are broadly consistent with implications of system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Past research has shown that people are motivated to accept the status quo, including findings that endorsing the status quo predicts ingroup-derogation among members of subjugated groups. For example, research has identified outgroup favoritism on status-relevant attributes (e.g., Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992), implicit biases against the ingroup (e.g., Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002), blaming the ingroup for its inferiority (Major, Kaiser, O'Brien, & McCoy, 2007), and support of hierarchy-maintaining governmental officials and inequality-reinforcing policies (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003). The finding that ingroup-derogation is associated with pro-system beliefs (e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2002) corroborates the hypothesis that ingroup-derogation may be ideologically motivated.

Although contemporary research on ideology has focused most on the ways in which ideology predicts perceptions of others, ideologies are also likely to situate the self in the world and society. Indeed, in addition to what is already known about ideologically inflected ingroup-derogation, the present research is the first experimental evidence that pro-system ideologies inflect self-derogation. Hence, participants in our samples did not just esteem high-status others (e.g., Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002) or loath others within the same subjugated social group (e.g., Jost et al., 2002), but actually said that their own labor merits less pay. They did not just cope with social inequity (e.g., Kay, Gaucher, Peach, Zanna, & Spencer, 2009; Napier & Jost, 2008), but actively contributed to the perpetuation of the hierarchy and inequality through underperformance and self-derogation.

Pro-system ideologies justify the preservation of the status quo. Such ideological imperatives foster a pro-system sense of the self, justifying the acceptance of a status quo that harms the material interests of the self. On the other hand, anti-system ideologies justify social change and resistance to the status quo. These ideological imperatives may motivate people to resist pro-system pressures. Although research on ideology to date has focused on the perplexing degree to which people justify the status quo, the current research complements by demonstrating the flip side of system justification. In both experiments participants who were anti-system ideologically defended against the robust effects of stereotype threat, resulting in self-enhancement and superior performance. The capacity to resist the influences of the dominant ideologies and effects of stigmatized identities is rare (see also Crocker et al., 1991; Oyserman et al., 1995), yet this research suggests that individual difference in ideology is a promising way to identify such effects in the future.

In conclusion, research on ideology has demonstrated the disturbing degree to which people can rationalize the status quo even when the status quo disadvantages their personal and ingroup interests. Research on stereotype threat has demonstrated that people can attitudinally and behaviorally confirm ingroup stereotypes even when it results in self-devaluation and underperformance. This research represents a step toward understanding one way in which these heretofore independent research traditions might be integrated, and suggests that political ideology can prepare its adherents to either accept or reject their social roles, facilitate or inhibit subordination, and perpetuate or resist social inequality, and to do so even in the pocketbook, in dollars and cents.

References

- Abelson, R. (1995). *Statistics as principled argument*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Crocker, J., & Major, B. (1989). Social stigma and self-esteem: The self-protective properties of stigma. *Psychological Review*, *96*, 608–630.
- Crocker, J., Voekl, K., Testa, M., & Major, B. (1991). Social stigma: The affective consequences of attributional ambiguity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *60*, 218–228.
- Croizet, J., & Claire, T. (1998). Extending the concept of stereotype threat to social class: The Intellectual underperformance of students from low socioeconomic backgrounds. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *24*, 588–594.
- DuBois, W. E. B. (2007). *The souls of Black folk*. New York: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1903)
- Gray-Little, B., & Hafdahl, A. R. (2000). Factors influencing racial comparisons of self-esteem: A quantitative review. *Psychological Bulletin*, *126*, 26–54.
- Hardin, C. D., Cheung, R. M., Magee, M. W., Noel, S., & Yoshimura, K. (in press). Interpersonal foundations of ideological thinking. In J. Hanson (Ed.), *Ideology, psychology, and law*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor (2001). *Shadow Report to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Regarding the Report of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China*. Retrieved Oct 3, 2009, from <http://www.hkhrm.org.hk/english/reports/docs/2001CERDfinal.rtf>
- Hong Kong SAR Government Census and Statistics Department (2007). *Quarterly Report of Wage and Payroll Statistics*. Hong Kong: Author.

- Hong Kong SAR Government Information Centre (2006). *Entry of Foreign Domestic Helpers*.
Hong Kong: Author.
- Inzlicht, M., & Ben-Zeev, T. (2000). A threatening intellectual environment: Why females are susceptible to experiencing problem-solving deficits in the presence of males. *Psychological Science, 11*, 365–371.
- Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 33*, 1–27.
- Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin, 129*, 339–375.
- Jost, J. T., & Hunyady, O. (2002). The psychology of system justification and the palliative function of ideology. *European Review of Social Psychology, 13*, 111–153.
- Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M. & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities. *Annual Review of Psychology, 60*, 307–333.
- Jost, J. T., Pelham, B. W., & Carvallo, M. (2002). Non-conscious forms of system justification: Cognitive, affective, and behavioral preferences for higher status groups. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38*, 586–602.
- Jost, J. T., Pelham, B. W., Sheldon, O., & Sullivan, B. N. (2003). Social inequality and the reduction of ideological dissonance on behalf of the system: Evidence of enhanced system justification among the disadvantaged. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 33*, 13–36.
- Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. *Psychological Review, 94*, 319–340.

- Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., Peach, H. M., Zanna, M. P., & Spencer, S. J. (2009). Inequality, discrimination, and the power of the status quo: Direct evidence for a motivation to view what is as what should be. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97*, 421–434.
- Kluegel, J. R., & Smith, E. R. (1986). *Beliefs without inequality: Americans' view of what is and what ought to be*. Hawthorne, NJ: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Levy, B. (1996). Improving memory in old age through implicit self-stereotyping. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71*, 1092–1107.
- Luhtanen, R., & Crocker, J. (1992). A collective self-esteem scale: Self-evaluation of one's social identity. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18*, 302–318.
- Major, B., Barr, L., Zubek, J., & Babey, S. H. (1999). Gender and self-esteem: A meta-analysis. In W. B. Swann, J. H. Langlois, & L. A. Gilbert (Eds.) *Sexism and stereotypes in modern society: The gender science of Janet Taylor Spence* (pp. 223–253). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Major, B., Kaiser, C. R., O'Brien, L. T., & McCoy, S. K., (2007). Perceived discrimination as worldview threat or worldview confirmation: Implications for self-esteem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92*, 1068–1086.
- Markus, H. R., Mullally, P., & Kitayama, S. (1997). Selfways: Diversity in modes of cultural participation. In U. Neisser & D. A. Jopling (Ed.), *The conceptual self in context: Culture, experience, self-understanding* (pp. 13–61). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Marx, D. M. & Stapel, D. A. (2006). Distinguishing stereotype threat from priming effects: On the role of the social self and threat-based concerns. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91*, 243–254.

- McCoy, S. K. & Major, B. (2007). Priming meritocracy and the psychological justification of inequality. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43*, 341–351.
- Mullen, B., Brown, R., & Smith, C. (1992). Ingroup bias as a function of salience, relevance, and status: An integration. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 22*, 104–122.
- Napier, J. L., & Jost, J. T. (2008). Why are conservatives happier than liberals? *Psychological Science, 19*, 565–72.
- Osborne, J. W. (2001). Testing stereotype threat: Does anxiety explain race and sex differences in achievement? *Contemporary Educational Psychology, 26*, 291–310.
- Oyserman, D., Gant, L., & Ager, J. (1995). A socially contextualized model of African American identity: Possible selves and school persistence. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 69*, 1216–1232.
- Pratto, F., Liu, J. H., Levin, S., Sidanius, J., Shih, M., Bachrach, H., & Hegarty, P. (2000). Social dominance orientation and the legitimization of inequality across cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 31*, 369–409.
- Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M. & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable relevant to social roles and intergroup relations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67*, 741–763.
- Rosenthal, R., & Rosnow, R. L. (1984). *Essentials of behavioral research: Methods and data analysis*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Rudman, L. A., & Feinberg, J., & Fairchild, K. (2002). Minority members' implicit attitudes: Automatic ingroup bias as a function of group status. *Social Cognition, 20*, 294–320.
- Schmader, T. (2002). Gender identification moderates stereotype threat effects on women's math performance. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38*, 194–201.

- Schmader, T., Johns, M., & Barquissau, M. (2004). The costs of accepting gender differences: The role of stereotype endorsement in women's experience in the math domain. *Sex Roles, 50*, 835–850.
- Schmader, T., Johns, M., & Forbes, C. (2008). An integrated process model of stereotype threat effects on performance. *Psychological Review, 115*, 336–356.
- Shapiro, J. R., & Neuberg, S. L. (2007). From stereotype threat to stereotype threats: Implications of a multi-threat framework for causes, moderators, mediators, consequences, and interventions. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11*, 107–130.
- Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). *Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sinclair, S., Hardin, C. D., & Lowery, B. S. (2006). Implicit self-stereotyping in the context of multiple social identities. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90*, 529–542.
- Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African Americans. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69*, 797–811.
- Steele, C. M., Spencer, S. J., & Aronson, J. (2002). Contending with group image: The psychology of stereotype and social identity threat. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 34, pp. 379–440). New York: Academic Press.
- Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. *Journal of Experimental Psychology, 18*, 643–662.
- Wheeler, S. C., & Petty, R. E. (2001). The effects of stereotype activation on behavior: A review of possible mechanisms. *Psychological Bulletin, 127*, 797–826.

Yoshimura, K., & Hardin, C. D. (2009). Cognitive salience of subjugation and the ideological justification of U.S. geopolitical dominance in Japan. *Social Justice Research*, 22, 298–311.

Author Note

Rick M. Cheung and Curtis D. Hardin, Department of Psychology, Brooklyn College and Graduate Center, City University of New York.

These experiments are based on a Master's thesis submitted by the first author under the supervision of the second author to the City University of New York. Portions of this research were presented at the 2008 International Society for Justice Research conference, in Adelaide, Australia and the 2010 Eastern Psychological Association meeting in New York. For thoughtful discussions of this research, we thank David Amodio, Rainer Banse, Glen Hass, Louise Hainline, John Jost and members of his laboratory at New York University, and members of our own laboratory. We thank Alexandra Hanson for proof reading, and Dorca Casseus, Marcus John, Wai-Fong Lung, and Christopher Wilker for assistance in data collection.

Footnotes

¹ The nonsignificant 3-way interaction is likely due to the fact that it fits a model in which the 2-way cross-over pattern observed among women performing the logic task is completely reversed among women performing the verbal task (e.g., Abelson, 1995; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984)—a pattern neither predicted nor found. Congruent with this point, a contrast analysis using a 3-way interaction model that fits the predicted pattern is significant. The set of contrast weights that predicts a cross-over interaction in the logic conditions (+1, -1, -1, +1) and null effect in the verbal conditions (0, 0, 0, 0) was significant, $t(76) = 3.21, p = .002$.

² Although the omnibus 3-way interaction was significant, for the same reasons noted in Footnote 1, it is important that the specific interaction effect we predicted, fitting a cross-over interaction in the logic conditions (+1, -1, -1, +1) and null effect in the verbal conditions (0, 0, 0, 0), was significant, $t(70) = 2.06, p = .04$.

Figure Captions

Figure 1. Economic self-worth as a function of ethnicity identity salience and social dominance orientation among foreign domestic workers in Hong Kong (Experiment 1).

Figure 2. Economic self-worth as a function of gender identity salience, political orientation, and task among American women (Experiment 2).

Figure 3. Stroop performance as a function of gender identity salience, political orientation, and task among American women (Experiment 2).





